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The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (2002 Farm Bill) initiated
counter-cyclical dairy income support known as the Milk Income Loss Contract
(MILC) program. Through this program, producers receive direct payments equal
to a portion of any shortfall of fluid milk prices below a specified reference price per
unit. As producers’ total benefits increase with output, up to a specified limit, this
program might be expected to stimulate additional milk production. The MILC
program is but a single feature in a complex dairy policy landscape, however.
Arguably, the most prominent dairy policy instrument in place today is the Dairy
Price Support Program (DPSP), instituted in the early 1930’s. Under the provisions
of the DPSP, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stands ready to purchase
nonfat dry milk (NFDM), butter, and cheese to support market prices for milk. 
Concerns have been raised by dairy industry participants regarding the possible
interaction of the DPSP and MILC policy instruments. Specifically, the MILC
program could be encouraging increased production, ultimately necessitating
additional removals of dairy products to maintain prices at support levels
(Stephenson, 2004). Indeed, some lawmakers have asserted that “the MILC program
is directly at odds with the Dairy Price Support Program,” and the debate in 2005
regarding MILC’s renewal was contentious (Dairy Business, 2005, p. 4). Ultimately,
the program was extended with slightly different payment features. The new,
extended program is referred to as “MILCX.”
This research tests for changes in aggregate milk production due to the operation
of the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program since 2002. Aggregate
production is decomposed into the size of the dairy herd and milk production per
cow. We find no statistically significant response in either variable. This finding
implies that the simultaneous operation of income and price support programs in
the United States has not, thus far, proven self-defeating.
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1 Howard and Shumway (1988) estimated that the dairy herd size adjusts only 9% of the way towards long-run
optimum levels in one year. Chavas and Klemme (1986) found that herd size takes more than ten years to adjust to
a sustained change in the milk price.
The expectation that an income support program should result in increased
production in periods with low market prices is consistent with a basic theoretical
analysis (e.g., Gardner, 1987, pp. 22S24). The original MILC program, however,
featured complications that are not considered in textbook examples. First, MILC
payments were only paid on the first 2.4 million pounds of each producer’s output,
implying that industry structure was an important determinant of the extent of the
incentive for increased production. Second, the program provided only a partial
output price guarantee to producers. Payments were calculated in such a way that as
market prices declined, producers’ marketing revenue decreased at a faster rate than
MILC payments increased, as described in greater detail below. Lastly, the original
MILC program featured a “sunset provision,” by which payments were meant to
cease in September 2005. This provision, combined with a limited ability of
producers to increase production in the short-run, might have significantly reduced
producers’ perceived incentive to increase output, for they might have anticipated that
significant increases in their production levels would have arrived only as the
program expired. These features of MILC might have been effective in avoiding a
significant supply response to the program, and the extent of any such response is an
empirical question.
In the present study, we empirically measured the effect of the introduction of the
MILC program on aggregate U.S. milk production. More specifically, we tested the
hypotheses that the introduction of the MILC program has caused an increase in the
equilibrium level of the U.S. dairy herd and that it has caused producers to increase
average milk production per cow. Given that changes in herd size occur very slowly,
the full effects of the program might not be realized for several years yet, so a further
objective of this study was to measure the potential total long-run effect of the
continued operation of MILC on U.S. milk supply.
1 Finding a significant positive
effect of the operation of the MILC program on milk output would imply that the
program has increased potential DPSP expenditure and that the current configuration
of U.S. dairy programs is to some extent self-defeating.
The results of this study will be useful to those crafting dairy policy. As stipulated
by the 2002 Farm Bill, the original MILC program expired on September 30, 2005,
and the program has been renewed for only twenty-three additional months. The
possibility of the program’s extension beyond the summer of 2007 will undoubtedly
be the subject of debate in the near future. Evidence regarding supply response to
the program will be useful in this regard.
Background
Dairy policy in the United States is comprised of several interrelated policy
instruments, three of which we briefly describe. The oldest component of dairyBryant, Outlaw, and Anderson Supply Response to MILC   135
policy, dating to 1933, is the DPSP. Under this program, the CCC purchases any
quantities of butter, cheddar cheese, and NFDM that manufacturers wish to sell at
specified support prices. Support prices for individual products are set at levels such
that processing plants of average efficiency will pay producers the congressionally
mandated overall milk support price. The overall milk support price is currently
$9.90/cwt., and the support prices of butter, cheese, and NFDM are $1.05, $1.13,
and $0.80/lb., respectively. Purchased product may be sold by the CCC into
domestic or international markets in times of higher prices or may be distributed
gratis through food assistance programs. Net (of CCC sales) expenditure on dairy
product price support over the period 2002S2005 totaled approximately $1.4
billion.
Another long-standing feature of U.S. dairy policy is the federal milk marketing
order (FMMO) system, instituted in 1937. Under this program, USDA establishes
minimum prices that producers must be paid by processors and product manufactur-
ers, based on the various uses that they make of raw milk. These uses are divided
into four classes; Class I represents the use of milk as a beverage, and the remaining
classes cover various non-beverage dairy products. All class prices are calculated
using fixed formulas that take wholesale prices for cheese, butter, NFDM, and dry
whey as inputs. Accordingly, they serve to guarantee the operating margins of
processors, while effectively transmitting product price risk upstream to producers.
Individual FMMOs cover most portions of the country, California being a notable
exception. Prices for Classes II through IV are consistent across all regions, while
Class I prices vary by region according to a schedule of differentials. 
Marketing order prices are used as an input in the newest component of U.S. dairy
policy, the MILC program, which was first authorized by the 2002 Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act. Originally under this program, in months when the Class
I milk price under FMMO number 1 (covering the U.S. Northeast) at Boston,
Massachusetts was less than $16.94/cwt., producers received 45% of the difference
on their milk marketings up to a maximum of 2.4 million lbs./year. This formula
applied to producers in all regions of the country, including those not subject to
FMMOs. The production limit feature of the program implies that the further a
producer’s scale was above roughly 128 cows, the smaller benefits were, relative to
total production (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2004). The original MILC
program operated through September 30, 2005. The new MILCX extended program
covers eligible production from October 1, 2005 through August 31, 2007. MILCX
operates in the same manner as the original program, except that producers receive
only 34% of the amount by which the Boston Class I price is below $16.94/cwt.
Total MILC payments from the program’s inception through mid 2006 total slightly
over $2.4 billion. MILC expenditures and approximate DPSP expenditures (net of
CCC sales) during corresponding time periods are plotted in figure 1. Expenditure
on the MILC in the first program year (December 2001 through August 2002)
consisted mostly of retroactive benefits. MILC expenditures were fairly high in the
first and second program years, but have been substantially lower since.136   Fall 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
Given the relatively recent introduction of the MILC program, there has been only
limited investigation of its implications and effects. Gould and Hackney (2003)
described how large producers might time annual enrollment to maximize the
expected level of MILC payments given the seasonality in milk prices and
production and the 2.4 million pound production cap. Jesse (2005) argued that the
original configuration of the MILC program is unsustainable for three reasons. First,
the program has been more expensive than anticipated in an environment of growing
concerns over the federal budget deficit. Second, the production cap is contentious,
with large producers arguing that MILC disproportionately rewards small, inefficient
producers. Third, the program would likely be inconsistent with U.S. commitments
to liberalize trade, were a new agreement to materialize from World Trade
Organization negotiations. Herndon (2005) examined the effects of the MILC
program for twenty major milk producing states. The empirical specification he
employed does not capture the dynamics of dairy markets, and his tests are therefore
for short-run responses to the MILC program. For four of the twenty states (Indiana,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas), he found a significant and positive relationship
between production levels and the MILC dummy.
Several studies have looked at the effects of the two major components of federal
dairy policy—marketing orders and price supports. LaFrance and de Gorter (1985)
estimated the total costs (government expenditure plus changes in total surplus) of
government dairy programs from 1965 through 1980 to be approximately one-half
billion 1980 dollars per year. Helmberger and Chen (1994) found that FMMOs raise
blend milk prices somewhat, raise fluid prices substantially, and lower product




































Figure 1. Government expenditure on the Dairy Price Support Program
(DPSP) and Mill Income Loss Contracts (MILC)
*
* Net expenditure on the DPSP is approximate, and is calculated using published net
removals and support price data.Bryant, Outlaw, and Anderson Supply Response to MILC   137
and Chavas (2001) investigated the likely effects of various alternative dairy policy
scenarios. Their results are consistent with Helmberger and Chen (1994), showing
that eliminating the DPSP would somewhat lower blend milk prices, lowering
producer surplus and increasing consumer surplus. Simultaneously eliminating
FMMOs would result in even lower blend milk prices, sharply lower fluid milk
prices, and higher product prices overall, although these effects varied across
regions. Chavas and Kim (2004) found one redeeming quality in the DPSP: the
program was effective in reducing price volatility to some extent over their sample
period, although the reductions in support levels in the 1990’s caused increases in
volatility. They also found that the program affects price levels even over periods
when the support prices are nonbinding.
Other studies have been concerned with supply controls and government
surpluses of products accumulated through the DPSP in the 1980’s. Kaiser, Streeter,
and Liu (1988) examined the implications of replacing the DPSP with mandatory
supply controls. They concluded that supply controls would result in significant
welfare transfers from consumers to producers and that government surpluses of
removed products were likely to subside anyway following DPSP reforms instituted
in the Food Security Act of 1985. Dixon, Susanto, and Berry (1991) measured the
effects of two voluntary supply control programs implemented in the mid 1980’s on
milk production: the Milk Diversion Program (output reductions) and the Dairy
Termination Program (herd buyouts). They found that reductions in output were
minimal and fleeting. Bausell, Belsley, and Smith (1992) found that those same
programs were minimally effective in reducing government dairy product surpluses.
They concluded that reduced support prices under the DPSP would be considerably
more effective.
Modeling Strategy, Data, and Estimation
Changes in aggregate milk production are commonly explained by changes in the
size of the dairy herd and changes in the average yield of milk per cow. Previous
research has shown that a small portion of overall milk supply response to some
stimulus is due to changes in yield and that a larger portion is due to slowly realized
changes in herd size (Levins, 1982; Chavas and Klemme, 1986; Howard and
Schumway, 1988; Adelaja, 1991). It is therefore critically important that long-run
herd dynamics be adequately represented in our model of supply. Two broad
strategies have been employed in previous work. Some authors consider a dynamic
optimization problem faced by a representative producer, while others model
aggregate industry behavior using more empirical dynamic models. The former
approach was employed by Howard and Schumway (1988) and Weersink and
Howard (1990). In their models, a representative producer optimally controls herd
size to maximize the discounted stream of current and future profit based on
(unanticipated) changes in throughput prices and expectations regarding technical
change. Chavas and Klemme (1986) also followed the dynamic programming138   Fall 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
2 Chavas (2000) found that naïve expectations are the most common variety in U.S. beef production, a closely
related industry.
approach and incorporated extensive biological information regarding cow reproduc-
tion, growth, and productivity over their life cycles.
A greater number of studies, however, have employed empirical dynamic models
rather than explicit dynamic optimization. These models can be further classified
into two varieties: (a) those that model herd size (or overall milk production in
papers that do not model herd size and yield separately) as some form of distributed
lag in milk prices (Chen, Courtney, and Schmitz, 1972; Levins, 1982; Kaiser,
Streeter, and Liu, 1988; Adelaja, 1991) and (b) those that model herd size as a partial
adjustment process (LaFrance and de Gorter, 1985; Dixon, Susanto, and Berry,
1991; Bausell, Belsley, and Smith, 1992; Helmberger and Chen, 1994).
For our application, we selected the partial adjustment specification, to avoid the
complexities associated with the dynamic programming approach and the uncertain
economic interpretation associated with distributed lag models. We posited a
long-run equilibrium level of the U.S. dairy herd that is desired at time t: 
(1)
where X t is a vector of supply determinants,  is a fixed parameter vector, and u t is β
a random disturbance. We assumed that actual cow numbers, CN t, evolve according
to a partial adjustment process:
(2)
where is a scalar speed of adjustment parameter, with   The model is λ 01 ≥> λ .
estimated after substituting (1) into (2) and solving for CN t:
(3)
where   and   Short run effects of the supply determinants on
~
() ββ =− 1 λ ~ () . uu tt =− 1 λ
cow numbers are given by  , while long run effects are given by .
~
β β
We expect (i.e., cow numbers do not instantly adjust to the desired level) λ > 0
for at least three reasons. First, there are limits on the rate at which the dairy herd
can expand due to biological considerations and constraints on the number of
replacement heifers available for import. Second, dairy producers are likely to be
reluctant to adjust their capital stock if they believe current market conditions might
not endure. Third, dairy producers’ information regarding current market conditions
might be poor due to delays (associated with the operation of co-ops and the FMMO
system) in receiving the proceeds of sales.
We used expected levels of throughput prices as supply determinants, per
economic theory. We assumed these expectations are naïve.
2 The specific-price
series employed are the real U.S. All Milk Price (AMP), the real value in Decatur,
CN u ttt
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Illinois of farm corn and 48% soybean meal needed to produce a 16% protein
concentrate feed (FEEDP), and the real price of boning utility cows in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota (UTILP). Dairy cows and feed are clearly complimentary inputs in the
production of milk; therefore, we anticipated that the feed price would have a
negative effect on cow numbers. A larger herd can produce more milk; therefore, we
anticipated a positive relationship between milk prices and equilibrium cow
numbers. A large quantity of the joint product, utility beef, is produced by reducing
cow numbers; therefore, we expected a negative relationship between those two
variables. Our estimation equation is:
(4)
where MILC is a dummy variable that indicates the operation of the MILC program.
We included the interaction term MILC t × AMP t–1 to allow for the possibility that
the long run equilibrium dairy herd size might have become more sensitive to the
milk price since the introduction of MILC. We expect (i.e., the equilibrium herd
~
β1 0 ≥
size is not lower due to the introduction of MILC).
We employed a yield model very similar to the one used in Chavas and Klemme
(1986) and Kaiser, Streeter, and Liu (1988), wherein yield is a function of output
price (AMP), the non-fixed input price (FEEP), and a trend variable TREND that
serves as a proxy for improvements in production technology and herd genetics. The
equation we estimated is:
(5)
where YIELD t is average milk production per cow, D t
Season is a dummy variable that
is zero for the first half of the year and one for the second half (corresponding to our
bi-annual data frequency), vt is a random disturbance, and the γi are fixed parameters.
We again included the interaction term to allow for the possibility that yield might
have become more sensitive to milk prices since the introduction of MILC. We
expect, for producers might have changed feeding practices to increase milk γ 1 0 ≥ ,
production in response to the income support provided by MILC. We expect,
for milk production naturally tends to be highest in the spring.  γ 3 0 < ,
We used bi-annual data covering the sample period 1993 through the first half of
2006. The MILC program was in operation for the last four years in this sample
(second half of 2002 onward). Natural logarithms of series other than MILC,
TREND, and D
 Season were used for estimation in both equations. The data series used
and their sources are summarized in table 1.
CN MILC AMP MILC AMP
FEEDP UTILP u
tt t t t
tt t








01 2 13 1
41 5 1
YIELD MILC TREND D AMP









γγ γ γ γ
γγ
01 2 3 4 1
51 6 1 ,140   Fall 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 1. Data Series
Series Description Source
CN Cow numbers, United States Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook
AMP Real all milk price Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook
FEEDP Real value of corn and soybean meal used
needed for 16% protein feed
Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook
UTILP Real utility cow price Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook
YIELD Average milk per cow Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook




Season Dummy indicating the second half of year --
TREND Linear trend variable --
Equation (4) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Given that this
equation includes a lagged dependent variable, the presence of serial correlation
would render the OLS estimator inconsistent. We therefore carried out Durbin’s
(1970) Lagrangian multiplier test for serial correlation in the presence of a lagged
dependent variable. The h-test statistic was 0.058, which is distributed standard
normal, implying a p-value of 0.52. We therefore did not reject the null hypothesis
of no positive first-order serial correlation in u t.
Equation (5) was initially estimated using OLS. The resulting Durbin-Watson test
statistic was 1.35, which implies an inconclusive result for the 5% significance level
(Savin and White, 1977) and the possible presence of serial correlation and
inefficient estimates. We therefore based inference on a maximum likelihood
estimate of (5) with an autoregressive error structure:  where we vve ttt =+ − ρ 1 ,
assumed that et is normally, identically, independently distributed for all t.
Results and Discussion
Parameter estimates and their associated p-values are presented in table 2. Ignoring
the MILC coefficients momentarily, in the herd-size equation, all parameter estimates
were of the expected signs with the exception of the UTILP coefficient, a finding
that is not statistically significant. We found that the all-milk price had a positive
effect on herd size and was significant at the 20% level. The feed price had a
significant negative effect on cow numbers. The estimate of the speed of adjustmentBryant, Outlaw, and Anderson Supply Response to MILC   141
parameter, 0.967, implies that cow numbers should take approximately 21 periods, $, λ
or 10.5 years, to move halfway towards their long-run equilibrium level in response
to a sustained change in a supply determinant. Previous researchers have found
similarly slow responses in cow numbers, as noted above.
Table 2. Estimated Models of Herd Size and Yield
Variables Coefficient Estimate P-value
Herd Size Equation
    Constant 0.177 0.820
    MILCt !0.025 0.536
    AMPt!1 0.016 0.182
    MILCt × AMPt!1 0.014 0.499
    FEEDPt!1 !0.011 0.056
    UTILPt!1 0.000 0.988
    CNt!1 0.967 0.000
    R
2 0.966
Yield Equation
    Constant 8.236 0.000
    MILCt 0.076 0.327
    TRENDt 0.001 0.000
    Dt
Season !0.039 0.000
    AMPt!1 0.044 0.089
    MILCt × AMPt!1 !0.040 0.302
    FEEDPt!1 !0.033 0.010
    vt!1 0.366 0.281
    R
2 0.993
In the yield equation, we found that non-MILC related conditional mean
coefficients were significant and of the expected signs. The trend coefficient
indicated significant increases in yield over time, and the dummy variable coefficient
indicated lower yields during the second half of the year, as expected. Also as
expected, yields responded negatively to increases in feed prices. The p-value of
0.281 associated with the autoregressive coefficient for disturbances indicated no
significant serial correlation at the 20% level. The elasticities of herd size, average
yield, and aggregate milk production with respect to feed prices and the milk price
are presented in table 3. Like previous studies, we found that long-run milk supply
responses are substantially larger than short-run responses.142   Fall 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 3. Milk Supply Elasticities
Herd Size Milk Production
Variables Yield Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
Elasticities with respect to:
    Milk Price 0.044 0.016 0.718 0.060 0.762
    Feed Price !0.033 !0.011 !0.512 !0.044 !0.545
The primary quantities of interest are, of course, the coefficient estimates
associated with the MILC dummy variable. The estimated MILC dummy coeffi-
cients were not significantly different from zero in either equation. We were thus
unable to discern a statistically significant effect of operation of the MILC program
on either the size of the U.S. dairy herd or average milk production per cow. Even
if we made a type II error in failing to reject the null hypothesis that  is zero, the
~
β1
overall effect of the MILC program would still likely be fairly small. The coeffi-
cients associated with the milk price interaction terms in each equation were also not
statistically significant; therefore, we concluded that neither equilibrium herd size
nor average yield had become more sensitive to changes in the milk price due to the
introduction of MILC.
We considered several possible causes for this result. First, the recent appearance
of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada has affected the U.S.
industry. The U.S. has banned the import of dairy replacement heifers from Canada
since mid May 2003. This ban might have constrained the ability of U.S. producers
to increase the herd size, for all growth has necessarily been internal. Dairy cattle
imports from Canada totaled 67,203 head in 2002, the last full year of imports. The
U.S. dairy herd expanded by 121,000 in the last year (July 2005 S June 2006) in an
environment of high prices (see figure 2). The availability of Canadian replacement
heifers could have resulted in lower prices and facilitated a more rapid expansion.
However, this availability would affect the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium
rather than the equilibrium level of the herd size (in terms of our empirical model,
rather than  ). Therefore, our inference with respect to supply response to MILC λ β
should not be affected.
A second possible explanation for our result is the sunset provision of the MILC
program. The legislation authorizing the original MILC program stipulated that the
program would end on September 30, 2005, roughly three years after its initiation.
This provision, combined with the fact that the herd size can only increase fairly
slowly, might have led producers to refrain from adjusting their operating policies.
Not only would a policy of increasing herd size only begin to bear fruit in the late
stages of the original MILC program’s tenure, but producers might also have
perceived a risk that they would be situated with a larger than optimal herd for some
period of time after the program concluded. The sunset provision of the original
MILC program, combined with production delays, might therefore have resulted inBryant, Outlaw, and Anderson Supply Response to MILC   143
a production analog to Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis: producers
did not alter their behavior in response to supposedly temporary, one-time benefits.
Given that the program has been renewed, however, producers might not regard
future expiration provisions as credible and not view program benefits as temporary.
We must therefore caution that our primary result might not hold in the future.
A third possible explanation is that the built-in limits on the quantities of milk
produced that are used for calculating MILC payments might result in a negligible
effect (i.e., the payment limit has been effective in limiting the supply response to
the MILC program’s operation). Based on marketing order prices and actual total
MILC payments closer to the program’s inception, it appears that roughly one-fifth
of current production is used to calculate benefits. However, it is the extent of
potential new eligible production that is relevant to assessing the incentive for
increased output. Assuming no new entry into milk production, and assuming that
economies of scale will discourage existing large operations from dividing to
increase overall eligible production (which, at any rate, is not allowed under MILC
program rules), this potential will be determined by the number of existing
operations producing less than 2.4 million lbs./year and the extent to which their
production levels are below that limit. As of 2002, approximately 80% of dairy
operations had herds of under 100 head (U.S. Department of Agriculture, National
Agricultural Statistical Service, 2004), which would produce under 2.4 million
pounds per year, even at above average yields per cow. Approximately 45% of dairy
operations had herds of under 50 head. If only these latter operations’ herd sizes
increased by 50 head each, then at average yields per cow, total milk production in
the United States would increase by approximately 30%. Thus, existing small




































































Figure 2. Evolution of all milk price and U.S. dairy cow herd size144   Fall 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
A related consideration, however, is the evolution of industry structure and the
relative competitiveness of small producers. Jesse (2005) noted that since the
inception of the MILC program, the proportion of the dairy herd held by small
producers has declined, and the proportion held by larger producers has increased.
This shift suggests that increasing quantities of eligible milk production are being
held by producers for whom potential MILC payments are small relative to overall
revenue and whose decisions are less likely to be substantially influenced by the
program. Larger economic forces such as economies of scale and regional
comparative advantage are likely driving industry structure to evolve away from a
condition in which it would be responsive to MILC, even though the production
limit is not technically binding for many existing small producers.
Conclusions
This study tested for significant positive effects of the recently-instituted MILC
program on the size of the U.S. dairy herd and average milk production per cow. A
positive supply response to MILC would cause lower market prices for dairy
products than would otherwise have prevailed. These decreases, in turn, would result
in additional removals of products under the price support program in periods of low
prices. Therefore, it seems that simultaneous use of these two policy instruments is,
to some extent, self-defeating. We were ultimately unable to discern any statistically
significant supply response to the MILC program.
One explanation for our primary result is that the eligible production limit has
been effective in suppressing a supply response. Industry structure is such that
existing small producers could bring significant quantities of new qualifying milk
production to market. Industry structure has, however, been evolving towards larger
producers for whom the program is less beneficial relative to the scale of operations.
As a practical matter, the small producers are likely to be less competitive than the
large operations and less able to expand, even though they do not face a binding
MILC production limit. It might then be the case that the production limit is working
as intended, despite the possibility of new qualifying production from existing
producers. It is almost certain that a permanent income support program with no
such limit would result in a significant supply response.
Another explanation is that the producers might have been wary of increasing
herd size, anticipating that significant production increases and MILC program
benefits would arrive only as the original program expired. This latter explanation
implies that policy makers cannot safely assume that the continued use of
simultaneous dairy income and price support policies will not ultimately prove
self-defeating, despite the lack of evidence of such effects to date.
Concerns are often expressed regarding market distortions associated with
programs that feature benefits tied to current production. Our results suggest that at
the aggregate level, MILC is the cause of little if any market distortion. There is
therefore little motivation for decoupling payments from current production, unlessBryant, Outlaw, and Anderson Supply Response to MILC   145
the U.S. is compelled to do so because of multilateral trade considerations. Our
aggregate analysis may mask important regional effects, however.
To the extent that small producers are more heavily concentrated in the Northeast
and Upper Midwest, the regional effects of the MILC program should not be
overlooked. The program has benefited these producers during a period of low milk
prices and might have retarded the rate at which small producers are exiting the
industry. Dairy policy has been heavily influenced by regional considerations in the
past, and the MILC program is no exception. It might be that MILC is a regionally
and structurally targeted program that has been effective in providing aid to a
particular subset of producers.
Additional research might be helpful in understanding the possible effects that the
MILC program is having in dairy markets. State-level analysis similar to the analysis
performed in the present study might reveal differences among regions with varying
proportions of smaller producers. Also, repetition of the aggregate analysis
performed here after additional post-MILC renewal observations are available could
prove useful in determining whether the minimal or non-existent response that we
found is due to trepidation associated with the original expiration threat or due
instead to the evolution of industry structure away from producers who most
appreciate the program’s benefits.
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